Cao Đắc Tuấn (Danlambao) - Factors of the struggle include: ideals and objectives, internal leadership, power and force, methods of execution, and unity. The following is the analysis on the strengths and weaknesses of the two camps with respect to these factors.

1) Ideals and objectives: Guided by its ideals and objectives, the DC is absolutely stronger than the CC. 

The value of their ideals and objectives is their righteous meaning. Simply put, ideals and objectives may be classified into two types: righteous and evil. In a political or civil struggle, righteousness serves, or follows the will of, the majority of the people. Evil only serves the minority, usually the camp having the power, and goes against the people’s will. Usually, anything that is consistent with the way of life and the innate nature of the people follows the people’s will. 

The ideals and objectives of the CC may be interpreted through its 2013 Consitution as “... using Marxism and Leninism and Hồ Chí Minh thoughts as the ideological foundation” and the Vietnamese Communist Party as the force that leads the State and society (Article 4). In particular, “the armed people force shall be absolutely loyal to... the Party and the State” (Article 65).

The ideals and objectives of the CC are based on the nature of the struggle discussed above. They include promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights for the people of Vietnam.

Once the nature of the struggle is clearly understood, the differences between the ideals and objectives of the two camps become clear and unambiguous.

The CC has no righteousness:

Not only is the communist Marxism inconsistent with the way of life and the innate nature of the Vietnamese people, it also goes against the will of the people. One example is land ownership. The ownership of personal lands and inheritance of parents’ properties are basic to the way of life of the Vietnamese peasants for thousands of years. But the Marxists, either socialist or communist, want nothing to do with helping the peasants. It does not mean that Marxism, or its variations, is completely wrong. In fact, many people believe that democratic socialism brings freedom and justice to the people (Harrington 1992, 3). However, pursuing democratic socialism properly in the current world state of affairs is merely a dream of its supporters. That’s because too many mistakes have been made in the process of implementing democratic socialism, and very few can learn the lessons from these mistakes (Harrington 1992, 310-311). The benefits to the people of Vietnam are even further from reality because the leaders of the CC, past and present, have very little understanding, if not outright ignorance, about the appropriate theory of democratic socialism. It’s Nguyễn Phú Trọng, General Secretary of the VCP, who had to say, “At the end of this century, it’s unclear whether Vietnam socialism is flawless.” Because they don’t understand and don’t know how to apply appropriate theory, the CC tries to find a “doctrine” which is easy to understand so that they can instruct the Vietnamese people. That’s the cause for the birth of the so-called Hổ Chí Minh thoughts — a theory without theory. 

In the Vietnam War prior to April 30, 1975, the CC rallied the people by using the disguised ideal of struggle for independence, opposing the invading imperialists, and overthrowing the South Vietnam government. Many people believed in some of the objectives set forth by this disguised ideal, but up to now this disguised ideal has revealed its true face, which consists of wrong objectives. Worse, the CC did not sincerely pursue independence and merely used it as a guise in their ambition of occupying the South to serve communist China and the then Soviet Union. Their success in the past is not due to the strength of its phony rallying ideal, but is due to the CC’s physical power, methods of execution (as will be presented in the following), and sheer luck. History has shown that Vietnam could have achieved independence without a bloody war. The colonialist French finally returned independence to their occupied countries. The Americans had no interest in occupying remote lands and completely withdrew their forces from South Vietnam in 1973 (See, for example, Dân 2012). The regime of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the South, though imperfect, was built upon democratic principles (See, for example, Trần Trung Đạo 2014). Furthermore, the reality is that the communist government has been even worse than the government of the former RVN (Lind 1999, 234). More importantly, even if those objectives were the CC’s true objectives, it was not necessary to rely on communism to achieve them. 

It is necessary to emphasize what has already been pointed out in this article: The CC was not elected by the people in a democratic election; it usurped power by political tricks and violence. Furthermore, because they usurped power, not only are they not righteous, but they are also evil. The CC’s ideals and objectives consist solely of protecting their interests and maintaining their reign as long as they can.

Since it has no righteousness, it would be difficult if not impossible for the CC to succeed by supporting freedom, democracy, and human rights for only the elite few. Therefore, the CC has to change completely. Bringing righteousness to an evil entity is like carrying coals to Newcastle. The CC may try to prolong its survival as long as it can, but the more it drags on, the more responsibilities the CC leaders will have to bear and they will have to pay a very expensive price when the DC succeeds. But if it does change, then it would no longer be Communist. It would have to form a new political party, opposite to the DC, which at that time might have a new name, and no longer fight for democracy, because democracy has been obtained.

The DC has the power of righteousness in its hands:

Freedom, democracy, and human rights are basic principles of the human species and the way of life in all free countries in the world. Because the CC promotes an autocracy that violates the human rights of the people and forbids freedom of speech and other basic human rights, opposing the CC is designed to fight for freedom and democracy and oppose tyranny. Accordingly, the DC has the righteous cause.

This righteousness not only follows the basic principles of all free countries in the world, but it is also consistent with the innate democratic nature of the Vietnamese people. 

The concept of democracy in the present day is very different from that in ancient times. We cannot study the ancient concept of democracy using the current standards, such as political structures and election processes, because those standards didn’t exist long ago. We must use standards that are based on the basic principles that withstand the test of time and are not influenced by the more modern form of political structures. Such a principle is the principle of equality. The doctrine of equality states that democracy is established on the foundation of equal interests because "[d]emocracy is a method for making collective decisions in which everyone has an equal right to play a role." (Christiano). "Democracy requires that persons be treated equally insofar as autonomous participants in the process of self-government" (Post 2006, 28). Equality is foundational to democracy (ibid.)

The basic nature of the Vietnamese people in ancient times is equality. However, under a thousand years of Chinese domination, the Vietnamese society had been influenced severely by Confucianism. Consequently, the innate nature had been modified. Under Confucianism the females were not respected as much as males. Examples included education and property ownership through inheritance (Tran 2006). Even the Hồng Đức Code of the Lê dynasty embraced this inequality (Tran 2006, 131-132), though there were several articles in the Code promoting female rights (Ngô Vũ Hải Bằng). Nevertheless, the Viets still maintained their innate nature of equality expressed through gender, classes, and ethnicity.

The Diên Hồng Congress in the 13th century is a typical example. I believe that the democratic spirit of the Vietnamese people, rooted in the distant past, was expressed most earnestly in history at the height of Buddhism (Cao-Đắc 2014a, 339; Cao-Đắc 2014c), the main religion in Vietnam in the old days and most popular in the dynasties of Đinh, Lý, tiền Lê, and Trần. It remains the most popular in all the instituted religions (excluding folk religions or beliefs/faiths) in present-day Vietnam. The Dalai Lama confirms the democratic spirit in Buddhism (Dalai 1999). Whether or not it was influenced by Buddhism, the Diên Hồng Congress is not merely a historical event in the fight against the Mongols. It is eloquent evidence showing that the nature of the Vietnamese people is the passion for democracy. In the history of the world, no country has such a powerful democratic spirit like Vietnam expressed through the Diên Hồng Congress.

The Diên Hồng Congress is a concrete manifestation of Vietnamese innate democratic spirit, which starts from the equality foundation. There is abundant evidence in history and folktales about the equality nature of the Viets regarding family, marriage, class, and ethnicity. The survival of this evidence through centuries shows the strength of this equality nature.

The strongest proof is the folk tale about Âu Cơ and Lạc Long Quân. This mythical tale has been told by word of mouth from generation to generation and was recorded in writing in the book Lĩnh Nam Chích Quái in the 14th century. Nobody knows exactly when the tale was first told, but whover invented that story must have had a very solid grasp of the concept of equality. In addition, this person, or this group of persons, who invented this story must also have had a solid concept of family law, a concept that Western societies had to wait until the 20th century to begin to embrace. Simply stated, the parting is a divorce, and this divorce occurred by mutual consent with each party enjoying equal custody of the children (Duong 2001, 208-209). Of course the tale of Âu Cơ and Lạc Long Quân is merely fictitious. But the issue here is not the truth of the story. The issue is that the story was told and passed down through many generations, showing that the Vietnamese people accepted and most likely welcomed the story’s philosophy. In addition, while the story was recorded in writing in the 14th century, there is credible evidence that the story had been known long before that time, possibly for hundreds or thousands of years. 

In addition to the tale of Âu Cơ and Lạc Long Quân, there is abundant evidence in history and folktales showing the equality foundation of the Vietnamese people over centuries. Phùng Hưng, a ruler in the Annam Protectorate, the former name of a territory belonging to present-day Vietnam, was called Bố Cái Đại Vương after his death in 802. The title Bố Cái is a strange title. It may be interpreted as Father (Bố) and Mother (Cái). While there is suggestion that Bố Cái means a Great King, the title Bố Cái meaning Father and Mother seems to be more plausible. Calling a male ruler Bố Cái doesn’t totally express respect for him as both parents, but a respect for the equality of both father and mother in society. In the folktalke about Princess Tiên Dung and Chữ Đồng Tử (Duong 2001, 210), Princess Tiên Dung proposed to Chữ Đồng Tử, a poor common man having no clothes to wear. Other than the strange fact that a girl proposed to a boy, this tale shows a class equality that doesn’t discriminate against poverty. In history, Yết Kiêu and Dã Tượng were two poor men who were servants of Trần Hưng Đạo, but were well treated by Trần Hưng Đạo and considered as officials in the royal court. Nguyễn Nhạc, the Tây Sơn leader, married a Bahnar woman (Dutton 2006, 91). Though she was merely a concubine, and though Nhạc might have wanted to get sympathy from the highland minority tribesmen in the beginning of his uprising, this woman (called Miss Hầu) appeared to have real power. This story shows that Nhạc respected her and didn’t just want to use marriage for his political scheme.

In summary, the democratic spirit of the Vietnamese people existed in ancient times according to social equality through folklore and historical evidence. The struggle for democracy, therefore, is consistent with this innate nature.

The ideal and objectives promoting freedom, democracy, and protection of human rights for the entire population must be explained by the nature of the fight against the CC as presented above. The DC must emphasize that the CC seized power illegally and has never been elected by the people in a free democratic election involving all the people. The DC must focus on clarifying its ideals and objectives, not only within its own factions, but also to the entire population, and even to the CC. Since this is the most important factor, the DC must absolutely achieve success. Moreover, not only are the ideal and objectives for freedom, democracy, and human rights the key in the fight against the CC, they are also the indisposable key after the CC is eliminated and a democracy is established.

2) Internal Leasdership: With respect to this factor, in a narrow and short-term scope, both camps have weak points. However, in a broad and long-term view, the DC is stronger than the CC.

Usually, a camp should have an organization or leadership, especially when it is the one that is in power, like the CC. Some believe that the camp that does not have power, or the camp opposing the government, must also have leadership. Actually, it is not absolutely required; or if it is, the leadership during the struggle, especially at the beginning or in the middle, does not necessarily have to be unified, tightly organized, centralized, or hierarchical, as discussed below. 

The leadership of the CC will be shattered because of power struggles and self interests:

The CC operates under the leadership of the VCP, but there is a serious division within the VCP. The division is due to political alignment (for example, pro-Russian, pro-Chinese, pro-American), or power struggles and personal interests. More importantly, most of the leaders of the CC are incompetent, immoral, foolish in public communication, corrupt, or they abet corruption (See, for example, cited in Cao-Đắc 2014a, 333-334; Sharma 2012, 199-200; Hayton 2011, 19). Lee Kwan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, had to exclaim, "[T]hey rose up the ranks not because they managed the economy well or demonstrated a talent for administration. They did so by digging tunnels from the north of the country to its south for more than 30 years." (Yew 2013, 193). Therefore, even if the VCP is united, that unity will not create good leadership. However, thanks to power and physical force and methods of execution (see below), the VCP leadership can still survive for a while.

The CC may consolidate its internal structure by eliminating people who are weak, incompetent or corrupt, and recruit competent people. In reality, this is difficult for many reasons. First, the leaders of the CC are not likely to yield power to another group when they think they can stay in power for a long time. Second, the current leaders of the CC are all incompetent and know nothing about themselves. In addition, as if to cover up their own deficiencies, these leaders have a sickening and preposterous arrogant attitude. For example, they claim themselves to be the “peak of the intellects.” With mediocre ability and sick mentality, how can they select people who are more competent than they, even if they want to yield power? Third, even if they can find more competent people, this competency is that of an evil and fraudulent person because the core of the CC is evil and fraudulent. They may become less stupid and avoid being the laughing stock, but they will be more evil and crooked, and therefore would not last long.

The DC does not need a unified leadership at the current stage of the struggle:

The DC, domestic or overseas, does not have one leader, a group of leaders, or a unified leadership. Without a unified leadership, the DC usually operates erratically, separately, and even independently; therefore, some argue that it’s hard for the DC to create a large and efficient single force under current conditions. In addition, the DC focuses too much on various ways to deal with the CC and there are often debates on the best ways to fight the communists, leading to many disagreements. Moreover, the DC is often disrupted by the CC’s division tricks.

However, having a clear-cut or organized leadership is not necessarily effective, especially in the course of the struggle. If the leader or the group of leaders is incompetent, inexperienced, or makes mistakes, the struggle will be easily smashed. In this period of the struggle against the CC, it’s better not to have unified leadership, or to have only loose leadership. The reasons are as follows.

First, the nature of the struggle is multi-dimensional: ideology, politics, economy, culture, society, and mass media all interact. With this multi-dimensional nature, a unified leadership is hard to be created and if created, may even weaken the struggle. The DC should let the specialized players attack the CC according to their specialties. There may be conflicts or contradictions that may weaken the success of individual groups, but these conflicts may be minimized or lessened if these groups did not operate totally independently.

Second, in addition to its multi-dimensional nature, the struggle has strategies that are multi-faceted: non-violent, violent, moderate, mixed (hard and soft), attacking, or defensive. While different methods may nullify each other or create conflicts or confusion, each method has its own advantages and disadvantages. A unified leadership is forced to select a few main methods and discard others, which may create dissension. More importantly, it’s difficult for the leaders to find the most efficient method as the main strategy. Although history and other movements in Vietnam, including the experience of other countries, the Otpor! In Serbia in 1998-2004, the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia in 2010-2011 and Egypt in 2011, may give many valuable lessons and experiences (See, for example, Vũ 2012a-f); these lessons and experiences may not be applied effectively to the CC in Vietnam. The simple reason is that the CC in Vietnam is unlike any other group of thugs on earth and is the strangest phenomenon in the history of mankind. How is it possible in the world of the human species for a minority group that is cruel, wicked, stupid, foolish, and has unexpected luck, to bring preposterous foreign doctrines to dominate a majority of people who are intelligent, energetic, gentle, and have an indomitable spririt for 70 years in the North and 40 years in the South? The probability for such a human tragedy occurring in the 21st century is almost zero. Yet that human tragedy actually exists. Therefore, it is unlikely to have a past or presently known antidote anywhere in the world that can be used to deal totally with the CC. Accordingly, it’s better to let all solutions be freely tried. If any method does not work, it will be automatically discarded. Methods used in other countries or in Vietnam in the past may still be applied, but only in narrow situations and not sufficient for the entire struggle. 

Third, and I think is the most important reason, the seemingly unorganized structure of the groups in the DC is a signal for an emerging unified force in the model of the complex adaptive system as previously discussed.

When groups in the DC freely act with a common ideal, with or without interactions with the CC or other camps or forces, a unified leadership is unnecessary. In CAS, the organizer is not needed when the system structure follows some common parameter (Hartzog 2003). That common parameter, as discussed above, is the desire for freedom, democracy, and human rights. The local interactions among these groups will ultimately cause emergence of a well-formed structure having a force with strength more powerful than the total of the strengths of these groups. The leadership may be created during the process of this emergence, but it is a natural result of the emergence, not the cause of the emergence. The emerging process may be fast or slow depending on how the interactions operate. 

It is said that without a unified leadership, the DC is doomed to failure. The demonstrators won’t know when and where to gather, or how to carry out the protest. The financial contributions will be divided and will not be combined into large amounts to support large projects. The uprising will not be unified and will only be scattered protests, easy to be wiped out. True, the force of the DC needs to have unity. However, it should come at the right time. Though there is lack of unified leadership, the DC has scored many victories. Because there is no prescribed approach, the DC is able to create natural and spontaneous local interactions that help to accelerate the formation of the powerful emergence. Thanks to the scattered protests, the CC has revealed its brutality by using violent force and police crowds to suppress unarmed citizens. Thanks to the demonstrations of small numbers of people, many heroic images of the DC and the cowardly responses of the CC emerged. Vanda Lâm, for example, raised the banner imprinted with the flag of yellow background and three red stripes, and the CC animals brutally beat him (CTV 2014a). Facebooker Bé Mập Lai snatched the red flag of yellow star and tossed it away, an act that was later condemned on Facebook by a CC member who rallied terrorist acts against her. These images burn the determination and boil the anger of the DF to create a more and more powerful force. Without unified leadership, groups or individuals in the DC have a chance to carry out their acts freely. Therefore, there will be many creative responses to the CC’s tyranny. Yet another example is the group of ten female demonstrators who gathered in front of the communist Chinese consulate in Sài Gòn on June 4, 2014 to commemorate the 1989 Tianmen massacre. They too displayed the yellow flag of the former Republic of Vietnam for the first time after 1975 right in the heart of Sài Gòn. Finally, consider the clever act of Đinh Quang Tuyến who carried a shoulder pole with two loads of water at Tao Đàn public park in Sài Gòn on June 8, 2014 (Danlambao 2014). He raised two hand-written signs with the words “Water not sold, just complimentary” and “Losing water is death.” By playing with words, using the word “water” in Vietnamese to indicate the literal meaning of “drinking water” and the figurative meaning of “country,” this man exercised his freedom of speech in a crowded public park with words like a slap in the face of the CC. Surprisingly, he was untouched. However, not all creative ideas or new actions are good. But bad ideas or actions usually receive public criticisms and therefore are not repeated.

In summary, although the DC hasn’t had unified leadership, the lack of it doesn’t diminish the power of the DC as long as its groups pursue the same ideals and locally interact with one another in a natural manner. The suppression and oppression by the CC only accelerates the DC’s success.

Domestically and overseas, there may still be separate organizations serving secondary objectives, but all should be coordinated and support the supreme ideal and objectives. These localized interactions may eventually lead to the formation of s supreme organization, but it’s not necessarily important. Such a supreme organization, if formed as result of the progress of the struggle, needs to have fixed headquarters, an adequate budget, and an executive committee having respectable members. This central organization does not have to directly manage the supporting organizations but only needs to play the role of coordinating, communicating, and exchanging news and information.

3) Power and force: The CC is stronger than the domestic DC in materialistic aspects, but weaker than the domestic DC in spiritual aspects and will power. In addition, the CC trails well behind the overseas DC in both materialistic and spiritual aspects, especially in the areas of economy and political pressure. 

Because it used violence to usurp power, the CC has maintained a strong force of public security agents, police, and civil employees. Coupled with their methods of execution (see below), the CC is able to suppress the domestic DC. However, having a strong security force does not mean having an effective power. The CC’s security forces rely on their sheer numbers. In reality, the security agents are only physically stronger than the old people or women of the DC. They have arms, transportation means, shields, handcuffs and batons, but they may not be able to subdue the young men of the DC in a one-on-one confrontation. More importantly, these security agents usually are cowardly, accustomed to crushing old people and women. They lack the bravery of those in the DC.

The CC is actually fearful of the righteousness and the fighting spirit of the DC. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom during World War II, once said (1938), 

“You see these dictators on their pedestals, surrounded by the bayonets of their soldiers and the truncheons of their police. On all sides they are guarded by masses of armed men, cannons, aeroplanes, fortifications, and the like – they boast and vaunt themselves before the world, yet in their hearts there is unspoken fear. They are afraid of words and thoughts: words spoken abroad, thoughts stirring at home – all the more powerful because forbidden – terrify them. A little mouse of thought appears in the room, and even the mightiest potentates are thrown into panic. They make frantic efforts to bar our thoughts and words; they are afraid of the workings of the human mind.” 

It was as if this famous quote from Churchill aims at the present-day Vietnamese CC. True, the CC is very afraid of words and thoughts. Articles 88, 79, and 258 in the crimical code, the suppression of the demonstrations, and the jailing and arrests of the DC’s people, all show how scared the CC is of the DC’s words and thoughts. The CC is so fearful of the DC that it is afraid of any peaceful gatherings, even funeral ceremonies and public trash picking activities (Nguyễn 2014).

The power and physical force of the domestic DC are very limited, if not non-existent, because its people are living under the CC’s oppression. However, if the DC can rally a large number of young men, it can establish a significant physical force. More importantly, while it hasn’t achieved strong power and physical force, the domestic DC actually has formidable spiritual power and force, having influence domestically and overseas. It’s the spirit of fighting for freedom, democracy, and human rights. Unfortunately, that mighty force is not well appreciated by the people. Worse, the majority of the Vietnamese people fears the CC and therefore does not actively participate in the DC’s struggle (See, for example, Kim 2013; Trần Duy Sơn 2014; Vũ 2012a-f.) Many even hide their fear by criticizing the DC, siding with the CC. 

Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader in Myanmar, once said (Aung San 2010, 184), 

“Within a system which denies the existence of basic human rights, fear tends to be the order of the day. Fear of imprisonment, fear of torture, fear of death, fear of losing friends, family, property or means of livelihood, fear of poverty, fear of isolation, fear of failure... It is not easy for a people conditioned by fear under the iron rule of the principle that might is right to free themselves from the enervating miasma of fear. Yet even under the most crushing state machinery courage rises up again and again, for fear is not the natural state of civilized man.” 

Ironically, the fear of the other side exists in both the people and the CC. Sometimes, the question about the struggle between the people and the CC is not “Who has more guts?” but “Who fears the other more than whom?” However, as Winston Churchill pointed out and Aung San Suu Kyi confirmed, it’s the tyrant in power who fears the people’s voice and even under the most oppressive government machinery, the courage keeps rising up. The rising up of courage may follow the CAS as presented above. The people’s will to live and the local interactions between the people and the oppressive government bring out the unified courage of the entire population.

The spiritual power of the DC is the will to fight for human rights, freedom, and democracy, expressed through courage, endurance, patience, determination, and persistence. When these expressions are recorded in images, video clips, audio recordings, or any combination of these, and are transmitted to the mass public, their power is immeasurable. When violence increases, the fighting spirit has to be increased even more. A picture or a video clips showing a moment of distress or heroism of the activists will have a huge impact domestically and overseas.

Most importantly, the domestic DC must understand that it is the main component of the opposition against the communists. The overseas DC is ready to help but only to the extent that it can provide encouragement, funding, and political pressure. But as an old saying says, “You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs.” The domestic DC must actively run the show. The free world superpowers, especially the United States, really want to replace the tyrannical communist regime in Vietnam by a democratic regime, but the U.S. needs concrete proof to justify its intervention. Why would the U.S. want to intervene? The simple reason is that America wants to block communist Chinese expansion and help Vietnam become an economic power and long-term ally like Japan and South Korea. The concrete proof for the superpowers to intervene in Vietnam is the quantity and quality of the opposition against the CC. It needs only to have an organized protest in the entire Vietnam, with increasing participation of the people, to let the world see the wish of the Vietnamese people.

Obviously the CC has little to no power and force, physical or spiritual, overseas. The overseas DC has very strong power and spiritual force. The overseas anti-communist spirit becomes stronger and stronher despite the disturbance and division carried out by the CC. Remarkably, the percentage of young people in the overseas DC increases more and more. The anti-communist demonstrations, entertainment programs, mass media, and meetings demonstrate considerable participation of the young people. In addition, the power and force of the overseas DC is strongest in its economical and political aspects, as evidenced by local ordinances and laws in cities like Garden Grove, Santa Ana in the United States, which forbid Vietnamese government officials visiting there. Bills introduced by the U.S. House of Representatives condemning Vietnam regarding human rights issues should also be noted. Furthermore, the current and later generations of the overseas DC are holding and will hold important positions in government, military, and conglomorates in their adopted countries. These people will create economical and/or political pressures on the CC and lead to influences of international consequence. 

© 2014

(To be continued)

Already Published: 

- Know yourself and your enemy (Part 1): "Nature of the Struggle and a Model for the Struggle"

Tuấn Cao-Đắc
danlambaovn.blogspot.com

- Aung San, Suu Kyi. 2010. Freedom From Fear. Penguin Books, New York, U.S.A. 

- Cao-Đắc Tuấn. 2014a. Lửa Cháy Trong Mưa, dịch từ Fire In The Rain, cùng tác giả, Hellgate Press, Oregon, U.S.A. 

- Cao-Đắc Tuấn. 2014c. Chân Lý Tuyệt Đối. Phần Ghi Chú Lịch Sử và Sự Kiện. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/05/chan-ly-tuyet-oi.html (truy cập 25-5-2014). 

- Christiano, Thomas. Không rõ ngày tháng. Democracy As Equality. Không rõ ngày tháng. http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/FACULTY/RARNESON/Courses/christianodemocracy.pdf (truy cập 11-6-2014). 

- CTV Danlambao. 2014a. Sài Gòn: 30 người biểu tình yêu nước bị bắt. 19-5-2014.

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/05/sai-gon-ca-tiep-tuc-giam-giu-it-nhat-30.html (truy cập 1-6-2014). 

- CTV Danlambao. 2014b. Sài Gòn: Bất ngờ biểu tình trước lãnh sự quán Trung Quốc. 8-6-2014. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/06/sai-gon-bat-ngo-bieu-tinh-truoc-lanh-su.html (truy cập 8-6-2014). 

- Dalai Lama XIV. 1999. Buddhism, Asian Values, and Democracy. Journal of Democracy, 10(1), 3-7. Phật Giáo, giá trị Á Đông, và dân chủ, Phan Quốc Tâm dịch, 16-6-2014. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/06/phat-giao-gia-tri-ong-va-dan-chu.html (truy cập 17-6-2014). 

- Danlambao. 2014. Độc chiêu chống bán nước tại Sài Gòn. 9-6-2014. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/06/oc-chieu-chong-ban-nuoc-tai-sai-gon.html (truy cập 9-6-2014). 

- Dân Nam. 2012. Những Mốc Lịch Sử Quan Trọng Khởi Từ Thập Niên 1940. 5-2012. 

http://www.trinhanmedia.com/2012/10/nhung-moc-lich-su-quan-trong-khoi-tu.html (truy cập 5-6-2014). 

- Duong, Wendy N. 2001. Gender Equality and Women’s Issues in Vietnam: The Vietnamese Women – Warrior and Poet. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (191-326). Available at 

http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/783/10PacRimLPolyJ191.pdf?sequence=2 (truy cập 5-6-2014). 

- Dutton, George. 2006. The Tây Sơn Uprising. Society and Rebellion in Eighteenth-Century Vietnam. University of Hawai’i Press, Hawaii, U.S.A. 

- Harrington, Michael. 1992. Socialism: Past and Future. The Penguin Group, New York, U.S.A. 

- Hartzog, Paul B. 2004. 21st Century Governance as a Complex Adaptive System. 

http://www.panarchy.org/hartzog/governance.html (truy cập 6-6-2014). 

- Hayton, Bill. 2011. Vietnam: Rising Dragon. Yale University Press, Connecticut, U.S.A. 

- Kim My. 2013. Nỗi sợ hãi và phương thức trị liệu. 23-12-2013. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2013/12/noi-so-hai-va-phuong-thuc-tri-lieu.html (truy cập 25-5-2014). 

- Lind, Michael. 1999. Vietnam: The Necessary War. Simon & Schuster, New York. U.S.A. 

- Mitrany, David. 1951. Communism and the Peasants, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 276, Lessons from Asia (Jul., 1951), pp. 99-104. 

- Ngô Vũ Hải Bằng. Không rõ ngày tháng. Quyền lợi của người phụ nữ trong BỘ LUẬT HỒNG ĐỨC. Không rõ ngày tháng. 

http://e-cadao.com/tieuluan/linhtinh/luathongduc.htm (truy cập 11-6-2014). 

- Nguyễn Nữ Phương Dung. 2014. Nhóm bạn trẻ Sài Gòn bị tước đoạt quyền nhặt rác. 25-5-2014. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/05/nhom-ban-tre-sai-gon-bi-tuoc-oat-quyen.html (truy cập 25-5-2014). 

- Phạm Lê Vương Các. 2014. “Nhân danh lá cờ để phá rối và kích động bạo lực.” 16-5-2014. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/05/nhan-danh-la-co-e-pha-roi-va-kich-ong.html (truy cập 1-6-2014). 

- Post, Robert. 2006. Democracy and Equality. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 603, Law, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives (Jan., 2006), pp. 24-36. 

- Sharma, Ruchir. 2012. Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, U.S.A. 

- Tran, Nhung Tuyet. 2006. Beyond the Myth of Equality – Daughters’ Inheritance Rights in the Lê Code, pp. 121-144, in Việt Nam – Borderless Histories, Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony Reid (Eds.). The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, U.S.A. 

- Trần Duy Sơn. 2014. Vì sao dân ta sợ. 25-5-2014. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/05/vi-sao-dan-ta-so.html (truy cập 25-5-2014). 

- Trần Trung Đạo. 2014. Việt Nam Cộng Hòa, lối thoát của Hoàng Sa và dân tộc. 31-5-2014. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2014/05/viet-nam-cong-hoa-loi-thoat-cua-hoang.html (truy cập 31-5-2014). 

- Vũ Đông Hà. 2012a. Cuộc cách mạng của Sợ Hãi (phần 1). 8-7-2012. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2012/03/cuoc-cach-mang-cua-so-hai-phan-1.html (truy cập 29-5-2014). 

- 2012b. Cuộc cách mạng của Sợ Hãi (phần 2) - Những viên gạch nền tảng. 8-7-2012. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2012/07/cuoc-cach-mang-cua-so-hai-phan-2-nhung.html (truy cập 29-5-2014). 

- 2012c. Cuộc cách mạng của Sợ Hãi (phần 3) - Sức mạnh của đám đông. 6(?)-7-2012. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2012/07/cuoc-cach-mang-cua-so-hai-phan-3-suc.html (truy cập 29-5-2014). 

- 2012d. Cuộc cách mạng của Sợ Hãi (phần 4) - Kẻ gieo rắc sợ hãi cũng biết sợ hãi. 9-7-2012. 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2012/07/cuoc-cach-mang-cua-so-hai-phan-4-ke.html (truy cập 29-5-2014). 

- 2012e. Cuộc cách mạng của Sợ Hãi (phần 5) - Đám đông và những trò chơi tinh nghịch. 12-7-2012, 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2012/07/cuoc-cach-mang-cua-so-hai-phan-5-am-ong.html (truy cập 29-5-2014). 

- 2012f. Cuộc cách mạng của Sợ Hãi (phần 6) - Dilemma Action. 15-7-2012, 

http://danlambaovn.blogspot.com/2012/07/cuoc-cach-mang-cua-so-hai-phan-6.html (truy cập 29-5-2014). 

- Winston, Churchill. 1938. Winston Churchill Quotes. 

http://www.winstonchurchillquotes.net/ (truy cập 25-5-2014). 

1. - Yew, Lee Kuan. 2013. One Man’s View of the World. Straits Times Press, Singapore.